

~~Secret~~

Approved for Release CIA  
Historical Collections Division  
AR 70-14 1OCT2013

7 March 1995

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on 22 February 1995

1. The attendees included: Berger, Vershbow, Kerrick and Rice from NSC; Deutch and Slocombe from the Department of Defense; Tarnoff, Frasure, and Holbrooke from State; Fuerth and Saunders from the Office of the Vice President; Schefer from US/UN, Clarke and Christman from JCS; Adams for OMB, and MacEachin and myself for CIA. [ ]

**Plan B and Bosnia**

2. Bob Frasure reported that the diplomatic track is currently going nowhere. Frasure said that Milosevic previously had been deceptively positive about Plan B because he wanted to have discussions with the US. State was upset that Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev did not try to persuade Milosevic to meet with the Contact Group. [In the previous day's Principals-only meeting the Russians apparently were blamed as the main reason for the cool reaction to Plan B.] Frasure noted that Milosevic is not prepared to settle on these terms, but he probably would go to the negotiating table if sanctions were lifted in advance. [ ]

3. The British, French, and UK--the EU-3--were to meet with Milosevic on the 23rd of February. The Deputies agreed to instruct the Europeans that there would be no more carrots for Milosevic from the US. The US had gone as far as it could, and Plan B would not be on the table forever. There was some discussion of whether there would be any value to actually writing Plan B on paper; Frasure feared that attempting to do that might result in no formal Contact Group proposal because of the impossibility of reaching consensus. Fuerth doubted that the diplomatic process was as dead as State indicated and predicted that no matter how firm their resolve, they would be discussing a new proposal for Milosevic in the next couple months. Fuerth also indicated that should Plan B eventually be accepted, further discussions would be needed about the architecture for removing sanctions, such as the possible impact on the Yugoslav successor states. [ ]

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on 22 February 1995

### Bottom-up Review

4. There was a brief discussion of the tasking from the Principals to conduct a bottom-up review of US policy in the Balkans. The Deputies should explore deconflicting competing objectives, such as that no Americans would be sent into the Balkan conflicts with other objectives. Berger mentioned that if not sending US troops was our policy, we do not seem to be heading in that direction because of the real possibility of our helping UNPROFOR withdraw. Other goals mentioned include NATO cohesion and justice for Bosnia. Fuerth wondered whether this impacted on the decisions of what to do regarding an additional Macedonian deployment. Berger raised the need to explore strategic options, such as beefing up UNPROFOR with more robust engagement rules or withdrawing UNPROFOR and moving towards multilateral lift. He also mentioned the Principals' desire for a time line of decisions that must be made for alternative scenarios.

[ ]

5. Tarnoff of State argued that Croatia was such an important issue it could not wait for the bottom-up review of policy. Frasure mentioned the need to convince Tudjman to reverse himself on the UN mandate. Slocombe questioned the importance of UNPROFOR to Croatia since in his opinion it had been so ineffective in Bosnia. Berger noted that we are in the process of sending several thousand US troops to the Balkans without having a diplomatic strategy. Fuerth noted that at least the US commitment is supposed to be time limited, but if the Contact Group tries to isolate the US, we could just dump the problem in the Allies' laps.

[ ]

6. Kerrick described the scenarios paper the Principals had tasked CIA with doing. MacEachin mentioned that the scenarios paper needs to examine the drivers behind each of the scenarios. He mentioned that the Bosnians are getting more equipment and that all of the warring parties are preparing for more fighting. Deutch suggested are three ways to conduct a policy review: an outcomes approach, a drivers approach, or an issues approach--such as Macedonia reinforcement. He wanted to know who would be working the problem and feared the drafters needed more specific guidance.

[ ]

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on 22 February 1995

### UNPROFOR Augmentation and Withdrawal Planning

7. General Christman mentioned that the UN has accepted NATO's offer of 128 UNMOS, night-vision goggles and over-snow vehicles. The UN has also expressed interest in heavy engineering and construction equipment. Deutch indicated he wanted to await the results of the bottom-up review before promising more to the UN because it was possible there would be a decision to withdraw UNPROFOR rather than beef it up.

8. Clarke reported that the NATO operation plan focuses on withdrawal from Bosnia and as of now only treats Croatia as an addendum. Now the planners are working on an integrated plan, a so-called "audible" plan, that would be flexible enough to allow either Bosnia only withdrawal, Croatia only, or both missions. The operational plan would be created by 1 March and the tactical part by the end of the month. Perry has not been briefed yet because there are still some gaps in the plan.

9. According to Deutch, execution of the plan would cost the US \$1.3-1.9 billion. [In a later meeting it appeared he misspoke and this is the total NATO cost--not the US share which is estimated more like \$1 billion.] Deutch noted that DOD would be reluctant to undertake this mission without a prior supplemental appropriation even though this will be a tough sell on the Hill. Sandy Berger asked OSD to explore cost and payment options and noted that the President still has not decided on the Croatia option. Berger noted that it was pointless to consult with the Hill on this mission if the President still has not approved the mission in principle.

10. Frasure noted that withdrawal planning is complicated because Tudjman may perceive NATO's to Croatia as his ace in the hole. Frasure feared that next Tudjman would next request NATO secure his borders.

11. Clarke noted that the CINC believes prepositioning of communications is essential for any NATO operation. It gives a two-week advantage in any withdrawal scenario. Tarnoff was concerned that prepositioning impacts negatively on efforts to get Tudjman to change his mind since he'll believe NATO now accepts the withdrawal as irrevocable. Kerrick suggested that State urge other Contact Group states to push delay of prepositioning in the NAC. On prepositioning Deutch remarked he is nervous because of the message it sends the Allies, especially given that the President has not yet decided whether to promise US ground troops to withdraw from Croatia. He thought this decision needs to await an evaluation of our overall Croatia strategy.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on 22 February 1995

### IMET Agreement

12. The Deputies agreed to defer decision on implementing a 505 Agreement for Bosnia until after the bottom-up review is completed.

### Summary

13. Berger ended with a summary of the key decisions:

- The US has exhausted its patience and gone as far as it can on carrots for Milosevic.
- State will develop and coordinate a Croatian strategy paper.
- The interagency working group will work on papers for the bottom-up review of policy.
- The US will provide UNPROFOR equipment for the next part of augmentation but will await completion of the policy review.
- JCS will continue the planning process for the UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- Prepositioning of Phase 2 communications will be deferred pending the policy review.
- Several issues remain unresolved on the sanctions removal architecture.

Ray Converse

Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

~~Secret~~